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Executive Summary
Roadway departure crashes represent some of the most severe crashes for vehicle occupants. In
2016, these crashes comprised approximately 65 percent of all fatalities and 54 percent of serious
injuries throughout Kentucky. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) seeks to mitigate
roadside departure crashes through various means, particularly the installation of roadside barriers
such as guardrail. Each year, district offices submit their requests for guardrail needs, including
new installations. Due to high volume, KYTC must prioritize prospective guardrail installations
to match available funds with the most critical, or unsafe, sites. The KYTC guardrail rating
program (GRP) was established in 1989 as a process for identifying and prioritizing all guardrail
needs. Despite periodic updates, the program no longer meets the transportation industry’s safety
guidelines and policies. As a result, the Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) developed a new
GRP methodology incorporating transportation best practices.
KTC researchers conducted a literature review of national and state guardrail practices and
assessed the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide, the Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware, and
the Highway Safety Manual. The manuals did not provide clear guidance on prioritizing guardrail
needs. They did establish warrants for establishing guardrail needs, which researchers used to
further refine the proposed methodology. FHWA has issued various documents over the years
related to guardrail, but most focus on structural components and testing. The research team also
performed an online search query across 23 state DOTs to examine their guardrail programs. While
all states had internal guardrail programs, the research team identified two states, California and
Virginia, with methodology useful for KYTC’s program. California’s use of run-off-road (ROR)
crashes and Virginia’s cost-based guardrail measures both provided insights into the development
of the new GRP methodology for Kentucky.
KTC examined the existing GRP, including all 32 rating elements. The newly developed GRP
model focused on two main factors: crash frequency and crash severity. Crash frequency indicated
the probability of a vehicle departing the roadway, while crash severity measured the impact to the
vehicle’s occupants after a crash, most notably, crashes involving injury or death. Rankings for
guardrail need locations should maximize safety outcomes for run-off-road crashes, and crash
severity was the primary condition indicating the need for guardrail. However, where many highlyranked sites across the state had roadside hazards commonly associated with severe crashes, crash
frequency became increasingly important to consider in reducing the overall number of severe
crashes.
With a focus on crash frequency and severity, the research team and study advisory committee
chose 8 individual rating elements and assigned scoring attributes. All scored rating elements met
three criteria: (1) influenced crashes through crash severity, crash frequency, or both per published
research studies; (2) allowed for quantitative determination; and (3) remained comparable across
different projects. The research team developed four initial weighting models using the criteria.
Along with KYTC input, the team developed a final model with the following assigned rating
elements and weighted percentages (totaling to 100 per project):
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1. Speed Limit (5%)
2. Lane Width (5%)
3. Maximum Embankment Slope (18%)
4. Maximum Embankment Height (18%)
5. Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes (18%)
6. Excess Expected Crashes (18%)
7. Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object (18%)
8. Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope (18%)

The proposed model combined crash severity and crash frequency concepts through scored rating
elements to identify the most at-risk locations for run-off-road crashes. Overall, the new GRP
model did not differ significantly from the previous version but there were ranking changes
amongst the project sites. Overall, the research team identified five recommendations for KYTC:
•
•
•
•

Adopt the new GRP model methodology for use in ranking guardrail need projects across
the state
Provide KYTC personnel, including district offices, with the newly revised guardrail
survey form to collect the necessary data
Provide information and training sessions to KYTC personnel on the development rationale
for the new model and its subsequent implementation
Update the GRP online application and back-end IT architecture to match the new model
data collection and processing requirements
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1.

Background

1.1 Introduction
Roadway departure crashes occur when vehicles leave the roadway, encroach upon the shoulder,
and then crash at some distance from the travel lane. The most serious crashes occur when the
vehicle strikes a roadside fixed object or overturns due to steep slopes found alongside the road.
Roadside objects may include trees, utility poles, rocks, embankments, and bridge walls. Highway
design engineers and planners often seek to mitigate roadside hazards through established safety
criteria outlined in the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide. Guardrail and other types of longitudinal
barriers are used to deflect and protect vehicles from encountering roadside hazards.
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) District Offices identify their guardrail needs and
submit them to the KYTC Division of Maintenance. The Division of Maintenance is responsible
for prioritizing guardrail needs across the state and choosing the sites for new installation.
Maintenance officials prioritize guardrail needs using the guardrail rating program software. The
Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) originally developed KYTC’s guardrail rating
methodology through a 1989 research study (Report KTC-89-39, “Warrants and Guidelines for
Installation of Guardrail”). KTC, in conjunction with KYTC, periodically refined the guardrail
program, most notably in 2002 and 2009. The 2002 effort created an online database and software
user interface to allow district offices to input their guardrail preference locations. The 2009
updates included: (1) revised crash data reflecting the most recent statistics of roadside departure
crashes, (2) the critical rate calculator as the mechanism for obtaining crash data, and (3) hazard
rating descriptive text and template photographs. For the third update, the text and photographs
informed end users on the appropriate hazard rating to use when assigning subjective hazard
ratings to guardrail locations.
1.2 Problem Statement
The Division of Maintenance is responsible for identifying and prioritizing guardrail needs along
KYTC roads. The current KYTC system used to assess and rate guardrail needs—known as the
guardrail rating program (GRP)—last received an update in 2009. Since that time, the Highway
Safety Manual (HSM) has adopted a more rigorous methodology involving crash/accident data
elements. KYTC’s “accident rate” element within the current rating system uses legacy critical
crash numbers and rates as the foundation. However, the HSM’s “Potential for Crash Reduction”
factor has largely replaced critical crash numbers and rates due to increased statistical reliability.
Therefore, KYTC is exploring the adoption of HSM’s updated crash factor into their GRP.
The research team also reviewed elements of KYTC’s GRP and compared them to national
guardrail best practices to find additional improvements to the current system. Finally, since the
user interface and data inputs into the guardrail rating software directly influence the final ranking
results, researchers examined the guardrail need survey form. Differing backgrounds and
experience levels for district personnel responsible for entering the data may introduce subjectivity
into the process.
1.3 Objective
The Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) evaluated KYTC’s GRP and recommended updates
to improve the methodology behind prioritizing guardrail installations. The research team also
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evaluated and improved the statistical reliability and user interface for the guardrail rating
software, thereby maximizing safety outcomes. The project objectives are as follows:
•
•
•
•

Conduct literature review of state DOT best guardrail practices
Evaluate the current KYTC GRP
Update the GRP to suit KYTC’s current needs
Draft report of results and improvements to the GRP
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2.

Literature Review

The KTC research team conducted a comprehensive literature review on guardrail standards and
other state’s best guardrail practices. The literature review focused on procedures and policies used
to prioritize guardrail site placement, as well as methodologies that maximize safety within an
established budget. This chapter discusses the guidance on guardrail prioritization provided by
various technical and regulatory authorities, including AASHTO, Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), and state departments of transportation.
2.1 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) is a nonprofit advocacy organization that promotes transportation. In this role, it fosters research and
education programs serving technical practitioners, policy-makers, and the public. AASHTO has
led many efforts in developing transportation best practices, including roadside hardware. The
KTC research team reviewed current AASHTO manuals for information regarding guardrail
infrastructure. The findings are described further below.
2.1.1 Roadside Design Guide
The AASHTO Committee on Design, Technical Committee on Roadside Safety published its most
recent Roadside Design Guide (4th edition) in 2011. 1 This synthesis manual provided highway
officials and engineers with best practices relating to roadside safety. Researchers reviewed this
edition for factors warranting possible updates to Kentucky’s existing guardrail prioritization
program. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) originally adopted criteria from the firstreleased Roadside Design Guide, then called “Highway Design and Operational Practices Related
to Highway Safety” 2, as the basis for its GRP.
The research team reviewed the latest manual and found the most relevant changes in Chapter 5,
Roadside Barriers. This chapter provides technical requirements on different roadside barriers
(e.g., guardrail, cable barrier, etc.) and recommendations on their placement to minimize the
severity of roadway departures. The majority of factors that impact safety remained unchanged
from the 1988 Roadside Design Guide, to include: embankment height, embankment side slope,
roadside obstacles (i.e., culvert inlets and trees), speed, and annual average daily traffic (AADT).
Therefore, these factors remain valid for roadside safety.
The Roadside Design Guide also contains an independent safety analysis program, called the
Roadside Safety Analysis Program (RSAP). While useful, KYTC has adopted the practices in the
Highway Safety Manual for all of its safety program analysis. The RSAP uses a different approach
to estimate crash frequency than the Highway Safety Manual. Yet, many contributing factors are
the same in both analyses. Consequently, the RSAP program was not considered for determining
guardrail rating criteria.
2.1.2 Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware
Researchers reviewed the AASHTO Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware, better known as
MASH, 3 for potential guardrail rating factors that could be added to Kentucky’s existing guardrail
prioritization program. The MASH primarily focuses on crash testing procedures used to evaluate
roadside barriers, including guardrail and guardrail end-treatments, and authorizes their use on the
KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program
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federal highway system. In fact, the MASH describes several guardrail systems that meet crash
testing standards. One such system, the Midwest Guardrail System (MGS), was adopted by KYTC
in 2017. The MASH also provides guidance on conducting in-service performance evaluations
(ISPE) for highway maintenance programs. Yet, the MASH does not provide warrants or
recommendations for identifying optimal guardrail locations. Therefore, it could not provide
additional insight into KYTC’s guardrail prioritization methods.
2.1.3 Highway Safety Manual
Next, the research team assessed AASHTO’s Highway Safety Manual (HSM) 4 for guardrail
placement guidelines. The HSM provides highway officials with methods and statistical tools to
evaluate highway safety, particularly in estimating crashes and assessing countermeasures to
reduce them. The HSM does not specifically address the issue of guardrail placement. In this
context, it did not provide additional guidance on prioritizing guardrail installation needs. Yet, it
did provide detailed safety methodologies used in today’s state of practice. Therefore, HSM
concepts have been adopted into KYTC’s current policies and processes and were used within the
new GRP. Additional details on KYTC’s use of HSM methodologies are discussed further below.
KYTC uses the HSM as the basis for implementing safety concepts into its policies and procedures.
The critical rate factor (CRF) compares a segment’s actual crash rate to a crash rate that is
considered critical, or much greater than the average crash rate for a segment of that roadway type.
KYTC defines critical crash rates as those rates greater than or equal to three standard deviations
above average for a given roadway type. 5 Yet, recent research has shown that CRF is not the most
accurate or reliable method to compare a segment’s crash performance to similar type segments.
CRF assumes that crashes and traffic volume have a linear relationship, which may not always be
true. The CRF does not address regression to the mean bias, meaning it does not account for
temporal crash fluctuations. 6
The HSM improves safety performance evaluations of segment-based crash frequencies through
statistically rigorous methodologies. This peer-reviewed manual determines excess expected
average crash frequencies with an Empirical Bayes adjustment. 7 Kentucky’s Strategic Highway
Investment Formula for Tomorrow (SHIFT) model uses the same HSM methodology to evaluate
safety across all statewide proposed projects. 8 KYTC has adopted the term Excess Expected
Crashes, or EEC, for this analysis. The EEC relies on two safety metrics: predicted crashes from a
safety performance function (SPF) and expected crashes from the empirical Bayes (EB) method.
SPFs are models that predict crashes, typically using the variables of segment length and traffic
volume. SPFs must be calibrated to local crash conditions for specific crash types in order to
accurately predict crash frequencies on a given roadway. The Empirical Bayes method adjusts the
SPF predicted crash frequency for a site using the location’s observed crash history (i.e., observed
frequency) to account for regression to the mean bias, resulting in the EB expected crashes (i.e.,
expected frequency). Next, the EEC is calculated as the difference between the EB adjusted crash
estimate and the SPF crash prediction. This means positive EEC locations experience higher
crashes, on average, than expected based on similar-type, similar-volume locations. Conversely,
negative EEC locations experience fewer crashes, on average, than expected based on similartype, similar-volume locations. The SPF graph below illustrates these terms in relation to one
another:
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EEC

Figure 1 Crash Frequencies 9
2.2 Federal Highway Administration
Upon completion of the AASHTO review, the research team assessed federal standards and
guidelines for guardrail placement. This analysis investigated the following documents from
FHWA’s Roadway Departure Safety website 10:
•
•
•
•
•
•

FHWA Roadway Departure Strategic Plan 11
An open letter to all in the highway safety hardware and roadside design community dated
May 26, 2017 12
FHWA Memorandum on the subject of In-service Performance Evaluation and Continuous
Monitoring of Roadside Safety Features dated November 17, 2005 13
Guardrail 101 14 is a document on FHWA’s Roadway Departure website that outlines the
purpose and function of guardrail. This document does not address where guardrail
installation may be warranted.
Report to Congress – Roadside Safety Hardware ID methods 15
FHWA Memorandum on Federal-aid Reimbursement Eligibility Process for Safety
Hardware Devices 16

These documents focus on testing infrastructure components, rather than warrants. Essentially, the
FHWA guidance provided the “how” on guardrail installation, but less on the “where”. Similar to
other literature reviewed, the FHWA guidance did not provide prescriptive guidance on
prioritizing guardrail site placement.
2.3 State Departments of Transportation
KTC researchers evaluated policies and practices for guardrail site selection and installation across
various state departments of transportation (DOTs). This was performed through an online
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guardrail program survey, whereby researchers conducted online search queries for guardrail
warrant programs and prioritization procedures for state DOTs. They ultimately selected and
examined 23 individual state DOT websites for their policies, manuals, and guidance. The
reviewed states included: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
During this process, researchers noted that all 23 state DOTs made their guardrail installation
procedures and material specifications available through their public websites. Each state also had
an internal guardrail warrant plan—an established process indicating when guardrail installation
is required at a given location. Yet, some states relied solely on national guidance for their guardrail
warrant program, primarily, the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide. Fourteen states actually
established their own guardrail warrant programs tailored to the needs of their state. These
programs sometimes included guardrail prioritization procedures. While useful, the individual
guardrail warrant programs varied significantly across their scopes and the years they were
enacted. The research team evaluated all 14 programs to determine if any programs or components
might be suitable for adoption in Kentucky. The summarized results are shown below:
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Table 1 State DOT Guardrail Warrants & Prioritization
State
Alaska
Arizona
California
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Maine
Minnesota
New York
Ohio
Rhode Island
Virginia

Guardrail Warrants or Prioritization Procedure
Spreadsheet tool to determine if guardrail is a cost-effective
countermeasure for a location
Minimum 75' guardrail installations, state warrants for guardrail
installation with curbs
Crashes, alignment, volume, speed, merge/weave areas, climate
and roadside recovery areas to determine guardrail need
Developed a warranting standard above the RDG. No
prioritization
Rigid objects that are more than 4" above surrounding ground
warrant guardrail
Prioritize location guardrail installations based on crash rate and
AADT
Guardrail is warranted where adequate vehicle recovery area
cannot be provided
Uses AASHTO guides to check for warrants in addition to
personnel evaluation. No Prioritization
Guardrail is installed if clear zone is insufficient or hazards
cannot be made crash worthy, and if funding is available
If warrants are met, guardrail is installed without prioritization
Install guardrail in conjunction with scheduled projects if it is
warranted
Risk-based comparison tool is used to prioritize locations needing
guardrail installation or upgrade

Washington Guardrail is prioritized based on benefit-to-cost ratio
Wyoming

Uses RDG to check for clear zone warrants with no prioritization
of installations

Established
Policy Year
1999
2018
2017
2018
1998
1999
2017
1999
1999
1999
1999
2001
1999
1999

Based on this research, the research team narrowed down this list to two states of interest:
California and Virginia. Both states had robust guardrail programs that warranted further analysis.
The Caltrans and Virginia DOT guardrail policies and procedures are discussed below.
2.3.1 Caltrans
The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) establishes uniform practices for roadside
barrier installation and maintenance through their Division of Traffic Operations. Caltrans lists
five major criteria in selecting locations for their guardrail installation: collision history, roadway
alignment, operating characteristics, climate conditions, and roadside recovery area. First, they
analyze a site’s collision history to determine the incidence of run-off-road (ROR) crashes.
Elevated ROR crash rates help justify guardrail installation. Challenging roadway alignment
characteristics, such as isolated or short-radii curves represent another potential guardrail need.
Traffic volume, speed, and merge/weave areas are three distinct operating characteristics that may
require guardrail installation. All three characteristics are frequently associated with ROR crash
types, which guardrail helps prevent. Caltrans evaluates the frequency and/or severity of climate
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conditions such as fog, rain, snow, or ice as contributing factors to ROR crashes. Finally, any fixed
object placed within the recovery zone represents a hazard warranting mitigation, with guardrail
used as one possible countermeasure. 17
Conversely, other factors may prevent guardrail installation from further consideration. The
availability of resources (i.e., funding) and the roadway type occasionally limits the opportunity
to install guardrail. For instance, the agency may not install guardrail per routine warrants (e.g.,
fixed object found in the recovery zone) if multiple driveways are located nearby.
The Caltrans guidance describes explicit conditions and exceptions for guardrail installation, but
remains limited in its usefulness as a prioritization methodology. The research team did not find
any tools designated for new guardrail installation. However, for existing guardrail, Caltrans
prioritizes and schedules repairs for damaged guardrails based on several risk factors: highway
type, extent of damage, and probability of second vehicular strike prior to repair. The damaged
guardrail receives a rating of High, Medium, or Low to indicate its repair priority. 18
2.3.2 Virginia DOT and Multistate Survey
The Virginia Department of Transportation provides several tools for selecting and prioritizing
guardrail installation locations. Its hazard database tool logs roadside hazards on roadways that
merit guardrail installation and notes any locations already possessing guardrail. The hazard
database tool also stores traffic volumes, crashes, guardrail strikes in existing installations, and
recorded citizen complaints. The second tool, the guardrail screening tool, determines a monetary
value associated with crashes at a given location. This tool uses traffic volumes, crash history,
crash severity, and crash costs as the variables. A third tool also helps prioritize locations for new
guardrail installation. Users must provide inputs across a range of parameters to use the tool. The
inputs for each location include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Hazard length: length of hazard parallel to roadway
Severity index: 1-10 based on site characteristics
Annual average daily traffic (AADT)
Daily vehicle-miles traveled (DVMT)
main run cost: cost of linear portion of guardrail
run-on cost: end treatment cost
run-off cost: end treatment cost
removal cost: cost to remove any existing guardrail
other costs: additional improvements such as paint or reflectors
total site improvement cost: total site cost

The tool uses provided inputs to calculate five separate statistical measures for each site: total
guardrail mileage, severity, vehicle-miles, severity-miles, and severity-vehicle-miles. Each site is
ranked across the five categories, essentially resulting in five distinct ranked columns. Users may
choose any individual list, or a combination thereof, to produce their own overall ranking. The tool
also allows users to evaluate installation costs in conjunction with these ranks. For example, the
tool can calculate a cost ratio for each category, such as total guardrail mileage per installation
costs at that location. These cost ratios provide officials with another analysis tool in prioritizing
between new guardrail installations. It should be noted that this tool does not draw from a statewide
KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program
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requested guardrail installation database such as Kentucky has. Rather, the tool is used to compare
new guardrail installations across a limited number of site candidates across the state. 19
While developing these tools, the Virginia DOT reviewed and assessed other state DOT guardrail
installation and prioritization practices for possible inclusion into their program. Their survey cited
guardrail procedures and best practices across the nation, including KYTC’s GRP. Virginia
claimed that Kentucky’s GRP helped them identify factors for guardrail need. However, they were
uncertain how KYTC developed its weighting assignments for each guardrail factor, which
hindered their ability to fully adopt it. The list below summarizes the results of Virginia’s guardrail
survey: 20
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Washington uses a benefit/cost ratio to compare guardrail locations.
Rhode Island recommends upgrading/installing guardrail in conjunction with other
scheduled projects.
Indiana evaluates potential locations with high crash rates and prioritizes installations using
traffic volume.
New York evaluates potential locations to determine if clear zone is sufficient and installs
guardrail if it is insufficient. Guardrail is also installed when hazards cannot be made crash
worthy. No prioritization performed, although funding limits the number of installations.
Ohio uses warrants to determine when guardrail is needed, but does not prioritize
installation locations.
Minnesota and Wyoming use AASHTO guides to determine when guardrails are
warranted. No prioritization is used.
Alaska uses a spreadsheet to perform cost-effectiveness analysis using traffic data, grade,
number of lanes, lane width, highway type, slope, obstacles, severity of hazard, and cost
factors to determine if guardrail is economical, but did not state if the spreadsheet is also
used to prioritize locations.

The Virginia DOT conducted their survey in 1999. Due to the time elapsed, the research team
investigated the originally surveyed states’ procedures and practices to determine if they were still
current. In this effort, the research team reviewed the public-domain websites and any guardrail
reports/manuals for the state DOTs listed on the survey. They found no additional evidence in the
form of updated policies, procedures, or best practices that deviated from the original survey
findings.
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3.

Guardrail Rating Program

KYTC’s Division of Maintenance is responsible for identifying and prioritizing guardrail needs
across the state. They receive requested guardrail projects from each district office. Similar to most
transportation programs, the infrastructure demands greatly exceed the resources available to fund
them. Consequently, KYTC relies upon their GRP to assess and prioritize new guardrail
installations for all requested locations. KYTC’s GRP currently uses the methodologies developed
by KTC in 1989, with 2002 and 2009 updates (see Background section). KYTC employees use a
guardrail survey form to collect information and assign attributes to their potential guardrail site,
and submit this information through their online GRP. A copy of their current guardrail survey
form is provided in Appendix A. The below provides an illustration of the GRP output with
project rankings.
Table 2 KYTC Guardrail Rating Program
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3.1 Guardrail Rating Elements
KYTC has an established guardrail rating system that evaluates potential guardrail installations
across 32 site conditions. Devised in 1989, the Warrants and Guidelines for Installation of
Guardrail report provides the original methodology KYTC used to prioritize guardrail
installations. 21 The report describes the guardrail rating elements used when evaluating locations
for guardrail need. Elements #1-13 help KYTC assign objective attributes to proposed guardrail
locations. These attributes characterize a site location by road name, route, latitude, and longitude,
among others. Because these elements are objective, they do not receive a score to be used in
determining overall rankings.
The remaining elements (#14-32) correlate with safety conditions — primarily run-off-the-road
crashes — at a given site. The current GRP assigns numerical values to ten elements in the set,
identified as the hazard-index point system. These ten determine how the guardrail need at a given
site will be prioritized, or ranked. The hazard point index elements and the maximum number of
points allowed per category include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Typical Embankment Slope (10 points)
Typical Embankment Height (10 points)
Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance from Edge of Traveled Way (10 points)
Are there any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane? (5
points)
Lane Plus Shoulder Width (10 points)
Speed Limit (10 points)
Average Daily Traffic (10 points)
Number of Accidents (15 points)
Accident Rate (15 points)
Subjective Hazard Rating (5 points)

The combined total from these ten elements calculates the score at any given location (see
Appendix B for the original guardrail hazard-index point system and accompanying descriptions).
In the final step, the prioritization process sorts all guardrail need sites by their single assigned
score. KYTC selects those locations with the highest scores for future guardrail installations. All
guardrail rating elements, both the scored elements and non-scored, are shown in Table 3. Note
that all ten elements used in the hazard-index point system are indicated by double asterisks (**).
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Table 3 Current KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements
Item
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements
Highway District
County
Route
Road System
Terrain
Road Name
Rural/Urban
Road Type
Latitude
Longitude
Mile Post - Begin
Mile Post - End
Length (miles)
Typical Embankment Slope**
Typical Embankment Height**
Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Way**
Distance From Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zone
Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane?**
Select Existing Barrier Type
Existing Barrier Condition
Lane Plus Shoulder Width**
Lane Width
Speed Limit**
ADT**
Number of Accidents (if Available)**
Accident Rate (if Available)**
Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating**
Remove Linear Length of Guardrail
Install Linear Length of Guardrail
Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded Condition?
Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle?
Additional Comments
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3.2 Guardrail Rating Evaluation
Since the original GRP methodology was derived by KTC in 1989, it may contain terms or
practices that are no longer used in today’s methodologies. The research team subsequently
evaluated each guardrail rating element to determine if updates or removal were required. The
evaluative process occurred through the framework of qualitative and quantitative criteria.
3.2.1 Guardrail Rating Criteria
The evaluation process involved a line-by-line analysis across all 32 rating elements through four
criteria: appropriateness, weighting, consistency, and scalability. The research team selected these
four criteria to examine the rating elements through different perspectives, and ultimately, to
improve the overall methodology for selecting proposed guardrail locations. The definitions for
these criteria are as follows:
•
•
•
•

Appropriateness - The degree of usefulness for an element within the guardrail rating
program.
Weighting - The degree of importance or emphasis placed on an element if it retains the
ability to disproportionately affect the outcome.
Consistency – A measure of the ability to clearly define data elements for the end user,
minimizing the probability that data elements may be misinterpreted to affect outcomes.
Scalability – The degree to which a rating element can be assigned a flexible numerical
value across a given range.

The first criterion, appropriateness, represents the very foundation for each rating element’s
inclusion into the guardrail prioritization process. A rating element must be relevant to the
selection process, and if not, it could become a strong candidate for removal. In this context, all
rating elements must be appropriate in terms of either: (1) usefulness as an assigned attribute for
the guardrail site and therefore, provide a unique identifier (e.g., location, length, etc.) or (2)
usefulness as a guardrail selection factor contributing to enhanced safety at that location (e.g.,
embankment slope, speed, etc.). The team evaluated each rating element’s level of appropriateness
by low (L), medium (M), or high (H).
The second criterion, weighting, assigns points to each rating element based on the current process,
also known as the hazard-index point system. As previously stated, the current system only assigns
weighting points to ten elements. The other elements were considered non-scoring elements, and
may be used as defined attributes or conditions for the site. During this evaluation phase, the
research team simply used KYTC’s current weighting scheme with their defined point system.
Chapter 4 describes how the research team developed and analyzed different weighting schemes
for the final, approved guardrail rating elements and assessed how they performed.
The third criterion, consistency, measures how clearly defined data elements are for end users (e.g.,
district personnel) and how they promote a shared understanding. Consistently defines the
probability that data elements may be misinterpreted, or even manipulated, so that the prioritization
process could become skewed. For example, KYTC officials noted that one particular rating
element, the roadside hazard rating, appeared to be more subjective than others. This meant that
district personnel may not be assigning values to their individual site’s roadside hazard rating in a
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consistent manner. The research team evaluated each rating element’s level of consistency by low
(L), medium (M), or high (H).
The fourth and final criterion, scalability, provides numerical scaling assignments to those
elements, where appropriate, in order to improve the final safety outcome. This initial evaluation
simply assigned numerical ranges based on KYTC’s current scale. Since only ten rating elements
were scored, those same ten elements were the only elements assigned a numerical value
corresponding to this metric. In the next phase of the project (see Chapter 4), the research team
developed and analyzed different scalability schemes for the final, approved guardrail rating
elements to promote improved flexibility in numerical prioritization. For example, some elements
employed the use of a step or jump function in their numerical rating (e.g., critical number of
crashes). These situations were assessed to determine if a sliding or continuous numerical rating
definition may be more appropriate. The full results from the guardrail rating element evaluation
for all four evaluation criteria is shown in Table 4.
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Table 4 Evaluation of Guardrail Rating Elements
Original Evaluation Criteria
Item
KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements
a
No.
Appropriate Weightingb Consistencyc Scalabilityd
H
0
H
NA
1 Highway District
2 County
H
0
H
NA
3 Route
H
0
H
NA
4 Road System
H
0
H
NA
5 Terrain
L
0
M
NA
H
0
H
NA
6 Road Name
7 Rural/Urban
M
0
M
NA
8 Road Type
M
0
H
NA
9 Latitude
H
0
H
NA
10 Longitude
H
0
H
NA
H
0
H
NA
11 Mile Post - Begin
12 Mile Post - End
H
0
H
NA
13 Length (miles)
H
0
H
NA
H
10
M
0-10
14 Typical Embankment Slope*
15 Typical Embankment Height*
H
10
M
0-10
16 Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Way*
H
10
H
0-10
17 Distance From Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zone
M
0
H
NA
18 Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane?*
H
5
H
0, 5
19 Select Existing Barrier Type
M
0
H
NA
20 Existing Barrier Condition
L
0
M
NA
21 Lane Plus Shoulder Width*
H
10
H
0-10
22 Lane Width
M
0
H
NA
23 Speed Limit*
H
10
H
0-10
24 Average Daily Traffic (ADT)*
H
10
H
0-10
25 Number of Accidents (if Available)*
M
15
H
0, 15
26 Accident Rate (if Available)*
L
15
H
0, 15
27 Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating*
M
5
L
1-5
28 Remove Linear Length of Guardrail
L
0
H
NA
29 Install Linear Length of Guardrail
H
0
H
NA
30 Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded Condition?
H
0
L
NA
31 Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle?
H
0
M
NA
32 Additional Comments
H
0
L
NA
* Rating Elements identified by present KYTC methodology as "Hazard Rating Points"
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3.2.2 Guardrail Rating Analysis
The KTC research team used the result from the evaluation criteria matrix to propose changes to
the GRP. The majority of rating elements received a high mark for appropriateness; 21 received a
High rating, while 7 were rated Medium and 4 were rated Low. The results for consistency
followed a similar trend: 23 were rated High, 6 rated Medium, and 3 rated Low. Rating elements
that received either Medium or Low warranted additional investigation by the research team,
including the possibility of removal or modification. The weighting and scalability criteria were
only applicable to the original hazard index rating elements. For these, the research team simply
assigned the current weighting and scalar ranges to each scored rating element.
After analyzing the scores for all the rating elements, the KTC research team presented their
recommendations to the KYTC study advisory committee. During a February 26, 2019 meeting,
KTC and the committee collectively decided upon the final changes to the existing guardrail rating
elements. Those results are shown in Table 5 below.
Table 5 Guardrail Rating Element Recommendations
Item
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements

No Change
X
X
X
X

Highway District
County
Route
Road System
Terrain
Road Name
Rural/Urban
Road Type
Latitude
Longitude
Mile Post - Begin
Mile Post - End
Length (miles)

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Status
Remove

Modify

X

14

Typical Embankment Slope a

X

15

Typical Embankment Heighta

X

16

Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Wayb

X

b

17

Distance From Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zone

18
19
20

Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane?b
Select Existing Barrier Type
Existing Barrier Condition

21
22
23
24

Lane Plus Shoulder Widthc
Lane Width
Speed Limit
ADT

25

Number of Accidentsd

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

d

26
27
28

Accident Rate
Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating
Remove Linear Length of Guardrail

X
X

29
30

Install Linear Length of Guardrail e
Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded Condition?

X

31
32

Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle?b
Additional Comments

X
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4.

GUARDRAIL RATING REVISIONS

The KTC research team and the KYTC study advisory committee collaborated to identify changes
to the existing guardrail rating system. Guardrail rating elements were placed into four categories:
no change, remove existing condition, modify existing condition, and propose new condition.
Rating elements were assessed through the four criteria — appropriateness, weighting,
consistency, and scalability — to strengthen the rating system. For example, changing the score
for consistency of an element would ensure field personnel all interpreted or processed a condition
in the same manner. In other instances, a condition was updated to reflect current transportation
safety practices, such as implementing the Empirical Bayes method of crashes. Per the original
guardrail condition matrix shown in Table 5, the full list of proposed revisions and descriptions of
those changes follow.
4.1
4.1.1

Description of Revisions
Modified/Revised Rating Elements

Item No. 14 – Typical Embankment Slope
“Typical embankment slope" lacked consistency in its implementation. Field personnel may see
typical as the average roadway embankment slope, or as a worst-case scenario, steep slope. The
main purpose for guardrail installation is to reduce crash severity along a roadway corridor. The
maximum embankment slope (or steepest) that occurs along a segment would likely result in the
most severe crashes. Therefore, the guardrail rating element was changed to “Maximum
Embankment Slope”.
Item No. 15 – Typical Embankment Height
“Typical embankment height" was the vertical height associated with the original typical
embankment slope. Since the latter term was changed, its associated counterpart, typical
embankment height, was updated to “Maximum Embankment Height”.
Item No. 16-17 – Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Way/
Distance from Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zone
Both elements listed here incorporated concepts related to the clear zone and embankment slope.
Per the Roadside Design Guide, the clear zone is "the unobstructed, traversable area provided
beyond the edge of the through traveled way for the recovery of errant vehicles".1 The two main
factors impeding a clear zone include adverse slope conditions and immovable, fixed objects in
the runoff road area. It is critical to know the horizontal distance available within the clear zone
prior to a vehicle encountering a roadside hazard such as adverse slopes and/or fixed objects.
Therefore, this guardrail condition was split into two similar elements addressing each roadside
hazard. They are: “Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest
Fixed Object” and “Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Critical
Slope”. It is important to note that only one of these elements will apply to a given location. This
determination will use a worst-case scenario comparing the location of the fixed object with the
critical slope. The hazard located nearest to the edge of through traveled lane will constitute the
worst-case scenario.
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Item No. 21 – Lane Plus Shoulder Width
“Lane width" was captured as a distinct category, while "lane plus shoulder width" were two
factors coupled together. Since both lane and shoulder widths were found to be key factors for
roadside departures, both elements should each have their own category. Therefore, this element
was revised to "shoulder width".
Item No. 25-26 – Number of Accidents / Accident Rate
The "number of accidents" and "accident rate" elements represent outdated safety performance
metrics not aligned with recent Highway Safety Manual (HSM) guidance. Consequently, new
elements aligned with national best practices and KYTC approved policies were required. The new
elements “Empirical Bayes expected crashes” and “excess expected crashes” would replace
“number of accidents” and “accident rate” using a series of derivations (described below).
Researchers developed a Safety Performance Function (SPF) to predict run-off-road crashes for
all the segments in the guardrail database. This SPF was developed using a statewide road dataset
with similar characteristics to those in the guardrail database, and calibrated to use only run-offroad crashes. This calibration allowed SPF to be used in any location in the guardrail database to
predict run-off-road crashes. The resulting SPF model was as follows:
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑒𝑒 −4.365 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 0.851

Where,
• ROR SPF is the predicted run-off-road crashes on a segment for a five-year period,
• L is the segment length, and
• AADT is the annual average daily traffic on the segment.
This model was developed using crash data over the 2013-2017 time period. The theta parameter
was 2.436, indicating the data had a strong fit within the model.
Next, the team calculated the empirical Bayes (EB) expected crashes. This process combined SPF
predicted crashes with historical crashes using a weighted parameter. The model’s parameter was
based on the degree of correlation between its expected crashes and the historical crashes. This
resulted in an expected crash value that was weighted between the empirical model and the
historical crashes. The weight parameter was calculated using the following equation:
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡 =

1
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
(
)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ
1+
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

Where,
• Weight is the resulting weight parameter that will balance between the SPF and the
historical crashes,
• ROR SPF is the predicted crashes from the run-off-road SPF,
• Length is the length of the segment, and
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•

Theta is the parameter describing how well the SPF correlates to the dataset (2.436
for this model).

The weight was then used to calculate the EB expected crashes using the following equation:
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡)
Where,
• EB Expected Crashes is the empirical Bayes expected crashes,
• ROR SPF is the predicted crashes from the run-off-road SPF (a five-year value),
• Weight is the parameter calculated using the previous equation, and
• Historical ROR Crashes is the actual number of run-off-road crashes on the segment
in the last five years.

Finally, to calculate EEC, the following equation was used:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

Where,
• EEC is the excess expected run-off-road crashes,
• EB Expected Crashes is the empirical Bayes expected run-off-road crashes, and
• ROR SPF is the SPF predicted run-off-road crashes.
Item No. 29 – Install Linear Length of Guardrail
“Install linear length of guardrail" element was expanded upon to reflect several important cost
factors associated with the installation of new guardrail. The research team consulted with the
study advisory committee and found that several factors contribute to new guardrail installation
costs: length of guardrail to be installed, number of end treatments installed, shoulder preparation,
cribbing, embankment in place, additional post length required, and guardrail connectors to a
bridge. All these factors were included in the new rating analysis, however, they will not be
weighted for scoring within the proposed rating system. Rather, KYTC will consider the new cost
factors when determining their guardrail budget and installation project cut-offs. Furthermore, the
combination of new cost factors may also assist KYTC decision makers when deciding upon two
similarly-ranked projects in terms of safety.
Item No. 31 – Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle?
The "hazard relocation" element was appropriate for mitigating risk, but lacked a clear and
comprehensive definition. Hence, the definition was expanded to address all risk mitigation
options: relocation, removal, and redesign. In addition, this rating element was rarely utilized by
respondents in their guardrail submittals. For the 4,602 data described previously, respondents
answered affirmatively to this question for only 0.5 percent of submitted sites. The modified
guardrail element became “Can the Fixed Object/s be Removed, Relocated, or Redesigned to
Mitigate Risk (Y/N)?”. Any of these options can satisfactorily address risks associated with
roadside hazards.

KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program

21

4.1.2

Removed/Deleted Rating Elements

Item No. 5 – Terrain
The "terrain" element scored low in the criteria for appropriateness. It was neither a unique
roadway attribute used for identification, nor was it a rigorously defined characteristic used in
safety analysis. Rather, the elements related to embankment slopes provide a clearly defined,
measurable attribute helpful in safety analysis. Terrain was often inconsistently applied across
districts.
Item No. 18 – Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Traveled
Lane?
The "culvert" element was removed since a culvert meets the definition of a fixed object.
Therefore, a culvert would be identified through the new "fixed object" element category.
Item No. 19-20 – Select Existing Barrier Type/Existing Barrier Condition
The "existing barrier" and the "condition" elements were removed because they received mediumto-low rankings for appropriateness. Each district office is responsible for selecting and submitting
their proposed guardrail needs. To this extent, any existing barriers should be evaluated by the
district to see how they might be upgraded or improved prior to submitting a guardrail need.
Consequently, the study advisory committee deemed these elements as unnecessary for the rating
process.
Item No. 27 – Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating
The "subjective hazard rating" was not clearly defined. Each district submitting a proposed
guardrail need must rely on his or her own background, judgment, and expertise in determining
what this element truly means. Therefore, it leaves the rating up for interpretation and introduces
inconsistency into the process, as indicated in its low consistency ratin). Therefore, it was removed
from the list of rating elements.
Item No. 28 – Remove Linear Length of Guardrail
The "remove linear length of guardrail" element was removed due to its low rating for
appropriateness. Similar to the removal of the "existing barrier" element described earlier, each
district should assess their individual site location and determine new guardrail needs. If existing
guardrail no longer meet specifications, then the district may submit the site as a new project.
Item No. 30 – Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded
Condition?
This element was not clearly defined. Similar to the subjective hazard rating, this condition relied
upon the background of the individual submitting the guardrail need project for its interpretation
and was subject to inconsistency. Furthermore, KYTC provided GRP data to the research team,
which contained all 4,602 guardrail sites under consideration. The research team analyzed this data
and found that only 1.1 percent of site submittals answered affirmatively to this question. Due to
this lack of clarity and low-response rate, this element was removed. The proposed GRP fully
addresses the concept of roadside hazards and risk within other elements and ensures that proper
warrants are used prior to any barrier installation, including guardrail.
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4.1.3

New Rating Elements

Route Suffix
“Route suffix” was added as another unique identifier for roadway locations, to be used as needed.
Describe Fixed Object/s (e.g., headwall, bridge end, etc.)
Fixed objects should not be placed within the clear zone. This is defined as a roadside hazard, and
was addressed in guardrail condition #17. However, the original methodology did not indicate the
nature of the fixed object. This element will allow Central Office decision-makers to understand
the type of fixed object present when making any evaluative determinations. It will also provide
additional context on the roadside hazard and allow for further discussions.
4.1.4

Proposed Guardrail Rating Element Matrix

The newly proposed guardrail rating element list includes 34 distinct categories, and includes the
changes discussed within this section. See Table 6 below, for a list of the proposed guardrail
rating elements.
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Table 6 Proposed Guardrail Rating Element Matrix
No.

Proposed KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Highway District
County
Route Prefix
Route Number
Route Suffix
Road System
Road Name
Rural/Urban
Road Type
Latitude
Longitude
Beginning Milepoint
Ending Milepoint
Length (miles)
Speed Limit
ADT
Lane Width (ft)
Shoulder Width (ft)

19

Maximum Embankment Slope a

20
21
22
23

Maximum Embankment Height (ft) b
Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object (ft)
Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope (ft)
Describe Fixed Object/s (e.g., headwall, bridge end, etc.)

24

Can the Fixed Object/s be Removed, Relocated, or Redesigned to Mitigate Risk (Y/N)?d

25

Empirical Bayes Expected Crashese

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Excess Expected Crashesf
Linear Length of Guardrail (ft)
Number of End Treatments
Other Cost Factors - Shoulder Preparation
Other Cost Factors - Cribbing
Other Cost Factors - Embankment in Place
Other Cost Factors - Additional Post Length Required
Other Cost Factors - Guardrail Connector to Bridge
Additional Comments

Definitions for Proposed Modifications
a

The steepest slope, or drop in elevation, occurring at the shoulder break along the identified roadway segment.

b

The vertical height measured from the bottom of the maximum embankment slope to the edge of the through
traveled lane.

c

The fixed object occurs multiple times along a roadway segment and maintains similar horizontal
offsets from the edge of through traveled lane (i.e., not highly irregular offsets), such as utility poles.
Otherwise, the fixed object is categorized as a single, unique occurrence or incident.

d

Refer to the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide, chapter 4, for risk mitigation options involving roadside hazards
within the clear zone. Any "Yes" responses will merit further evaluation.

e

Weighted crash estimate based on historical crash data and the safety performance function crash prediction.

f

The difference between the Empirical Baye's expected crashes and the safety performance function's predicted
crashes.
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4.2 Guardrail Rating Models
Guardrail ratings should maximize safety outcomes for vehicles departing the roadway, or runoff-road (ROR) crashes. The probability of a crash occurring at a given location is known as crash
frequency. Locations considered prone to a high number of crashes might require increased focus
if roadside hazards are prevalent. Still, the primary purpose for installing guardrail is to reduce
crash severity for ROR crashes. A guardrail will not reduce the probability of a crash occurring.
Rather, it mitigates the severity of ROR crashes when they occur.
4.2.1 Crash Frequency Factors
Crash frequency provides insight into the probability that a ROR crash may occur at a location.
By itself, crash frequency does not justify the installation of guardrail. However, it may provide
additional understanding into the likelihood of crashes occurring when prioritizing locations in the
most need of guardrail repair or installation. Studies have shown several factors contributing to
crash frequency including AADT, speed, lane width, and shoulder width.
The annual average daily traffic (AADT) counts represent traffic volume along a given corridor.
As research studies have shown, the frequency of crashes increase as AADT increases. Excess
vehicle speeds have been tied to an increasing number of crashes, as well as crash severity. 22
Several research studies have shown connections between crash frequency and the widths of
roadway lanes and shoulders, respectively. In both cases, decreasing widths contributed to an
increasing number of crashes. Fitzpatrick et al., demonstrated narrower lane widths increased
roadway departures for lanes less than 12 feet. 23 Similarly, several researchers have examined the
relationship between shoulder width and crash frequency. Most of these studies demonstrated that
decreasing shoulder width led to increases in the crash rate. For instance, Zegeer and Deacon found
that shoulder widths had a significant effect on crash rates. 24
4.2.2 Crash Severity Factors
Guardrail represents a safety countermeasure that reduces crash severity for vehicles departing the
roadway, or run-off-road (ROR) crashes. The Roadside Design Guide specifically recommends
the installation of roadside hardware barrier devices, such as guardrail, to reduce the severity of
ROR crashes.1 However, guardrail does not reduce the probability of a crash occurring, otherwise
known as crash frequency. Due to close proximity to the edge of pavement, the installation of
guardrail may lead to an increased frequency of ROR crashes. Crashes may occur as vehicles
departing the roadway have less free space to maneuver and may inadvertently strike the guardrail
prior to navigating back onto the roadway. Nevertheless, guardrail is an effective device to reduce
crash severity for vehicles leaving the roadway, thus serving its intended purpose.
Crash severity measures the effect of a crash on vehicle occupants. The Federal Highway
Administration uses a KABCO injury classification scale to assess crash severity, ranging from
non-severe to extremely severe crashes. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet similarly employs
the KABCO acronym as defined by the following terms: 25
•
•
•
•

K – Fatality
A – Incapacitating Injury
B – Non-Incapacitating Injury
C – Possible Injury

KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program

25

•

O – Property Damage Only

Many researchers have examined crash severity over the years and shared their results with the
transportation safety community. In these studies, they have evaluated many different factors
associated with ROR crashes and examined their influence on fatalities and injuries. Collectively,
research studies have demonstrated a few factors that have the most direct impact on crash severity:
steep slopes, fixed objects in the clear zone, and excessive speeds.
Roadside slopes are found on the roadway’s adjacent embankment. The slope of primary concern,
the foreslope, begins at the shoulder break. For fill sections, foreslopes decline in elevation from
the roadway surface at different rates. The Roadside Design Guide categorizes foreslopes into
three distinct categories: recoverable, non-recoverable, and critical. Recoverable slopes are flat
slopes (1V:4H or flatter) that allow the vehicle to recover and readily reenter the roadway
following departure. Non-recoverable slopes are steeper (between 1V:3H and 1V: 4H) slopes that
are traversable but do not allow the vehicle to easily reenter the roadway following departure.
Typically, the vehicle will continue down this slope until it reaches the toe. The steepest slopes are
critical slopes and include any slope at 1V:3H or steeper. Vehicles will continue down these steeps
slopes and are at increased risk for overturning, a leading factor in fatalities.1
Critical slopes represent the greatest danger to vehicle occupants during ROR crashes. Roadside
departures occurring along flat slopes with soils that support tires (and without fixed objects)
usually result in minimal crash severity. 26 Similarly, FHWA and the National Cooperative
Highway Research Program have published studies demonstrating slope flattening reduces severe
crashes, particularly fatalities and injuries. 27,26 On the other hand, extreme slopes leading to
overturned vehicles can result in the most dire outcomes. Neuman, et al. found that overturned
vehicles comprised nearly 42 percent of all ROR single-vehicle fatalities.26 A Texas Transportation
Institute (TTI) study discovered overturned vehicle crashes occurring on two-lane, rural roads in
Texas were twice as likely to result in a fatality. 28
Fixed objects located in the clear zone are another significant roadside hazard impacting crash
severity. Fixed objects are non-crashworthy objects that can disproportionately impact the
vehicle’s trajectory (e.g., snagging) or speed (e.g., rapid deceleration) and will injure the vehicle’s
occupants in the process. The FHWA and the National Cooperative Highway Research Program
have shown that removing fixed objects in the clear zone will reduce crash severity for roadside
departures. 29,26 When fixed objects are not removed, the consequences may be severe. For
instance, Zegeer et al. demonstrated that fixed objects frequently led to injury-producing crashes,
such as those involving utility poles (49.7 percent). 30 Neuman, et al. found that fatalities occurred
when vehicles struck fixed objects, including trees (25.4 percent) and utility poles (7.2 percent).26
Many research studies have examined vehicle speeds and their association with crash outcomes.
Speed is a factor that has been shown to be a contributing factor for both crash frequency and crash
severity. In the former, Liu and Subramanian examined single-vehicle ROR crashes and found that
nearly 90 percent of those crashes involved speeding vehicles. 31 The Institute for Road Safety
Research discovered a similar finding that crash rates increased as speeds increased. 32 Excessive
speeds also are highly correlated with severe crash outcomes. Past FHWA studies investigated
crash severity involving utility poles. They found a 50 percent chance of injury for collisions with
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poles with impact speeds as low as 6 mph. 33 A TTI study demonstrated a higher frequency of
fatalities for vehicles traveling at excessive speeds, at 10 percent, versus 7.6 percent for those not
speeding.28
4.2.3 Weighting Analysis
The research team developed a weighting scheme using the new guardrail rating elements. Similar
to the original methodology, only specific rating elements were used to evaluate, or score, the
benefits of guardrail installation in particular locations. The team initially selected 10 scored rating
elements from the newly developed 34 rating element list. These elements were identified by their
ability to meet defined, relevant characteristics for guardrail need. At a minimum, all scored rating
elements possessed the following attributes:
•
•
•

Influence crashes—both frequency and severity—based on various research studies
Allow for quantitative determination
Provide project-by-project comparison

Per the first criteria, some rating elements primarily correspond to crash frequency, while others
correspond to crash severity. The research team determined an appropriate crash basis
determination for each rating element using the research literature review discussed in sections
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The full list of scored rating elements and their corresponding crash element role
(i.e., frequency, severity, or both) are shown in Table 7.
The remaining 24 attributes from the approved guardrail rating element list (Table 6) did not meet
scoring conditions for various reasons. Several attributes did not receive scoring because they
served strictly as project site unique identifiers, such as highway route name, location (e.g.,
longitude, latitude), and road type. Consequently, they did not demonstrate the ability to influence
crashes or allow for direct comparisons. In fact, rating elements #1-14 on the list met this
definition. Other attributes (#23, #24) simply described a roadside hazard description, or a means
to mitigate the roadside hazard. These attributes did not quantify the existing hazard or provide a
basis for comparison. Therefore, they were not scored. Finally, the remaining rating elements #2734 described the factors that determined overall guardrail project costs. These include the overall
length of guardrail, number of end treatments, and various special cost cases (e.g., cribbing or
embankment in place). While useful for comparison purposes, the primary intent for the new
methodology was to focus on safety, and allow for comparisons in that perspective.
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Table 7 Scored Rating Elements by Crash Frequency and Severity
Item
No.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
25
26

KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements
Speed Limit
AADT
Lane Width (ft)
Shoulder Width (ft)
Maximum Embankment Slope
Maximum Embankment Height (ft)
Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through

Rating Element Role
Crash
Crash
Frequency
Severity
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object (ft)? a
Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through
Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope (ft)? a
Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes***
Excess Expected Crashes****

X
X

X

4.2.4 Weighting Models
Once the scored rating elements were identified, the research team developed four guardrail rating
models, each with different weighting assignments placed on crash frequency and crash severity.
To represent different guardrail prioritization methodologies, certain models assigned higher
weighting scores to either frequency or severity. The team initially developed a total of four
working models, described further below.
Model #1
All rating elements were weighted equally. This model assumed all guardrail rating elements
associated with roadway characteristics, clear zone characteristics, and crash characteristics were
no more or less important than other elements.
Model #2
Rating elements associated with crash characteristic (e.g., Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes and
Excess Expected Crashes) were weighted slightly higher than the other elements. This model
placed increased emphasis on the likelihood (or frequency) of a crash occurring at a given location.
Model #3
Rating elements associated with clear zone and crash characteristics were weighted significantly
higher than those involving roadway characteristics. This model balanced crash frequency with
crash severity.
Model #4
Rating elements associated with clear zone characteristics were weighted most heavily. This model
placed increased emphasis on elements most directly associated with crash severity.
On May 15, 2019, the research team and study advisory committee met and evaluated all four
models. The two groups assessed the advantages and disadvantages of each working model and
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decided upon model #3 as their preferred option, but with a few minor changes. For purposes of
discussion, this new model will be referred to as model #5. The changes from the previous model
included removing scoring consideration for AADT and shoulder width while simultaneously
boosting numerical scoring for other categories. Overall, model #5 weighted clear zone and crash
characteristics heavily. The full list of changes to this model are shown below:
Model #5
• Speed limit: decreased percentage from 14% to 5%
• AADT: removed this element from receiving a weighted score (but will retain as a nonscored rating element used as an attribute)
• Lane width: no change to weighted percentage of 5%
• Shoulder width: removed this element from receiving a weighted score (but will retain as
a non-scored rating element used as an attribute)
• Maximum embankment slope: increased percentage from 14% to 18%
• Maximum embankment height: increased percentage from 14% to 18%
• Horizontal distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the (nearest fixed object) OR
(critical slope)—use whichever is closer to the traveled lane: increased percentage from
14% to 18%
• Empirical Bayes expected crashes: increased percentage from 14% to 18%
• Excess expected crashes: increased percentage from 14% to 18%
The rationale for removing AADT as a standalone variable was its inclusion into other scored
factors already used in the methodology. For example, AADT is used as a component of five
separate elements: (1) Maximum Embankment Height, (2) Maximum Embankment Slope, (3)
Distance from Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object, (4) Empirical Bayes
Expected Crashes, and (5) Excess Expected Crashes. The concern among the research team and
study advisory committee was that including AADT as a standalone variable would significantly
overweight it as the “super” factor among all factors. Therefore, for the reasons listed here, the
decision was made to remove it as a standalone element.
The shoulder width element was also removed as a scoring factor for consideration. Similar to the
removal of AADT, shoulder width was removed due to its inclusion into other rated elements—
Horizontal distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the (nearest fixed object) or (critical
slope). The horizontal distance rating element allowed planners to determine if minimum clear
zone requirements were met and rendered the need for shoulder width unnecessary.
The remaining elements either decreased or increased in value commensurate with their
importance to guardrail need. Speed limit and lane width each decreased to 5 percent weighted
values for the new model, respectively. The research team reduced their percentages due to each
element’s general overall uniformity amongst competing guardrail projects. For example, many
guardrail projects have similar speed limits thereby rendering the use of this metric for comparison
purposes less useful. The remaining elements all increased proportionately to 18 percent. This list
includes: (1) maximum embankment slope, (2) maximum embankment height, (3) horizontal
distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the nearest fixed object or critical slope, (4)
Empirical Bayes expected crashes, and (5) excess expected crashes. These rating elements
received increases in their value due to their strong influence on crash outcomes, most notably
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crash frequency and severity, which has a direct link to guardrail need. Collectively, the summation
of these rating elements is equal to 100.
4.2.5 Rating Element Scores
After weight assignments, each rating element received a score corresponding to select attributes.
Each rating element was scored on a scale of 0-10 points, which assigned a consistent scale for
each element. Maintaining this scale across all rating elements allowed for a simple scoring
application before the follow-on weighting assignment. For example, if a location received a score
of 10 for its EEC, that rating element would be multiplied by 18% to determine how much it
contributed to the overall project score.
The Empirical Bayes (EB) expected crashes and excess expected crashes (EEC) each received an
assigned point score based on their distribution within subdivided categories. In this methodology,
the aggregated EB and EEC rating elements were assigned categorizations within 5 distinct value
ranges, or bins. Each bin contained approximately the same number of rating element values
distributed across the entire 4,600 projects currently identified in the KYTC GRP database. Rating
elements assigned to low-value bins were less likely to occur and consequently received lower
point values. For example, an EB less than one meant that less than one crash was expected to
occur at a location within the next 5 years. Therefore, that category received zero points. Similarly,
an EEC value less than zero meant fewer crashes were occurring than expected, also earning a
score of 0. The remaining four bins for EB and EEC were based on the distributions of the two
metrics for each project found in the GRP database. The point distributions for EB and EEC are
shown in Tables 8 and 9 below.
EB
<1
1<x<=5
5<x<=10
10<x<=15
>15

Points
0
3
5
7
10

Table 8 EB Points

EEC
<0
0<x<=1
1<x<=5
5<x<=10
>10

Points
0
3
5
7
10

Table 9 EEC Points

Using the same approach, the next rating element, lane widths, divided bins into a nearly equal
number of projects for each bin. The speed limit rating element adopted a slightly different
approach to rating element categorization. The research team assigned point values across this
range based on common speed limits for guardrail site locations, although the majority of sites fall
into the 55 mph bin. Both lane width and speed limit distribution are shown in Tables 10 and 11
below.
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Lane Width (ft)
<8
8<=x<9
9=<x<10
10<=x<11
>=11

Points
10
7
5
3
0

Table 10 Lane Width Points

Speed Limit (mph)
<=25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-70

Points
0
3
5
7
10

Table 11 Speed Limit Points

The remaining rating elements tiered into 5 distinct categories as before, but also relied upon
AADT as a distinguishing factor. Therefore, the maximum embankment height, maximum
embankment slope, and distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the (nearest fixed object)
or (critical slope) used a matrix table to account for both ranges. The AADT bins also reflected
nearly equal portions of guardrail sites within each bin, similar to the development of the other
bins.
The rationale for including AADT into the point matrix was to assess the risk of crash frequency
for each rating element. A higher AADT meant an increased volume of vehicles traveling and a
greater potential for a run-off-road crash. Therefore, the point assignment increased both as AADT
increased and as the rating elements became more severe. All three rating element matrices are
shown below, in Tables 12, 13, and 14.
Table 12 Embankment Height Points
Embankment
Height (ft)
<=5
5<x<=10
10<x<=15
15<x<=20
>20

0-250
0
1
2
3
4

AADT
251-500 501-1000 1001-2000
0
0
0
2
3
4
3
4
5
4
5
6
5
6
8

>2000
0
5
7
8
10

Table 13 Embankment Slope Points
Embankment
Slope
Flatter than 5:1
5:1 to 4:1
Steeper than 4:1

0-250
0
2
4

AADT
251-500 501-1000 1001-2000
0
0
0
3
4
5
5
6
8

>2000
0
7
10
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Table 14 Horizontal Distance (Fixed Object/Critical Slope) Points
Fixed Object/
Shoulder (ft)
<=7
7<x<=10
10<x<=12
12<x<=14
>14

0-250
4
3
2
1
0

AADT
251-500 501-1000 1001-2000
5
6
8
4
5
6
3
4
5
2
3
4
0
0
0

>2000
10
8
7
5
0

4.2.6 Comparison of Old and New GRP Models
Researchers applied the new guardrail rating model #5 to current locations in the guardrail
database, and directly compared the ranking of elements to the previous GRP model. Researchers
quantified the significance in ranking changes between models using the statistical measure
Spearman’s Rho. This non-parametric test measures the strength of the association between two
variables. In this case, the two associated variables were a site’s ranking in the previous GRP
system and its corresponding ranking using the new GRP model. One limitation in this analysis is
that the current GRP method does not collect data on “Horizontal Distance from the Edge of the
Through Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope”. Therefore, this element was not incorporated into
this analysis and all project scores and rankings were calculated using “Horizontal Distance from
the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object”.
After running both models, project rankings were tabulated for all sites, both old and new. Higher
rankings for guardrail need were associated with lower numerical values (e.g., rank #1 received
the highest assigned priority for guardrail need). Both lists with full rankings were compared using
the correlation function found in Microsoft Excel to determine a Spearman’s Rho value of 0.708.
In Spearman’s Rho, an R-value equal to 1 is interpreted as a perfect positive correlation while an
R-value equal to -1 is a perfect negative correlation. In other words, a positive 1 value means each
set of corresponding variables between two datasets are identical. Thus, a Spearman’s Rho value
of 0.708 demonstrated a high positive correlation between the old rankings and the new rankings.
Essentially, the new model improved upon the old model but did not significantly alter the overall
guardrail need rankings as an aggregate. In Table 15 below, the top-10 rankings found in the
previous GRP model are shown with their newly assigned rankings using the new model.
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Table 15 Top 10 Locations by Old Method
RT_Unique
016-KY-0070 -000
098-KY-0194 -000
010-KY-0005 -000
055-US-0421 -000
058-KY-1107 -000
049-KY-0036 -000
043-US-0062 -000
036-KY-1428 -000
098-KY-1499 -000
105-US-0025 -000

BMP
11.117
54
3.959
4.73
0
12.4
26.499
11.867
0
10.2

EMP
11.226
55
4.794
5.16
0.28
12.5
26.705
11.931
0.117
10.39

Length Old Score New Score Old Rank New Rank
0.109
89
86
1
9
1
87
59.1
2
324
0.835
86
80.6
3
18.5
0.43
85
84.2
5
11
0.28
85
82.7
5
13.5
0.1
85
64.4
5
172.5
0.206
84
72.6
7.5
52.5
0.064
84
71.9
7.5
60
0.117
83
79.1
11.5
20.5
0.19
83
75.5
11.5
31.5

As shown here, only one project retains its top 10 ranking in the new model (i.e., #1 old rank
transitioned to a #9 new rank). The remaining sites decreased in ranking value. Three sites slightly
decreased in rankings moving to #11, #13.5, and #18.5, respectively. In total, eight sites stayed
within the top 100 list, while only two fell outside the top 100 (i.e., #172.5 and #324).
The total guardrail need database contained over 4,000 locations. An examination of the entire
dataset revealed that only 23 sites in the original top 100 rankings decreased significantly in
priority. Those sites were ranked greater than 500 with the new model. Further examination of
these 23 sites demonstrated that only six of them had five or more crashes within the last five
years. All 23 sites experienced a relatively low Expected Excess Crash value meaning they were
not experiencing more crashes than expected. In addition, only seven of these sites had AADT
values exceeding 2,000, indicating relatively low traffic volumes. Therefore, the model
demonstrated its emphasis on road departure crashes, including AADT, comprising a key
component to modeling potential crash exposure. In Table 16 below, the newly assigned top-10
rankings are shown with model #5.
Table 16 Top 10 Locations by New Method
RT_Unique
093-KY-0053 -000
106-KY-0053 -000
093-KY-1694 -000
010-KY-0168 -000
056-KY-2052 -000
081-US-0062 -000
035-KY-0032 -000
019-US-0027 -000
016-KY-0070 -000
103-US-0060 -000

BMP
0
2.3
0.376
6.711
0.693
10.5
10
18.961
11.117
1.892

EMP
0.87
2.5
0.654
7
0.729
11
10.615
19.16
11.226
2.077

Length Old Score New Score Old Rank New Rank
0.87
50
95
962.5
1
0.2
75
90.6
79
2
0.278
48
89.6
1141.5
3
0.289
72
87.6
113.5
4
0.036
47
87.1
1247
5
0.5
77
87
58
6.5
0.615
53
87
776.5
6.5
0.199
43
86.1
1671.5
8
0.109
89
86
1
9
0.185
82
84.5
17
10

Several sites on this list were ranked rather low using the previous methodology. In fact, six of the
ten did not even make the top 500 rankings with the previous methodology. Expanding this
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analysis, the new model listed 37 sites now ranked within the top 100 that previously were ranked
greater than 500. Researchers examined these 37 sites and found that all of them possessed an
AADT greater than 2,000. Moreover, 14 of the 37 sites had an EEC equal to or greater than 5.
These high EEC values demonstrate that the new model targets locations experiencing more runoff-road crashes than expected. Many of these sites demonstrated high-risk factors related to crash
severity including speed limits equal to or greater than 55 miles per hour, fixed objects closer than
7 feet, embankment heights equal to or greater than 15 feet, and embankment slopes equal to or
greater than 3:1. Combining these crash severity and crash frequency factors provides a strong
rationale for why these locations moved up significantly in the new ranking structure, and
demonstrates the efficacy of the new model.

KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program

34

5.

Conclusion

The KTC research team employed best practices in safety analysis, including key concepts from
the Highway Safety Manual, to improve upon the existing KYTC guardrail rating program (GRP)
model. In this study, the team collaborated with the KYTC study advisory committee to understand
how they collect, process, and prioritize their guardrail need rankings at sites across the state. The
primary factors impacting run-off-road crashes were examined across a comprehensive literature
review and incorporated into the model’s analysis. Most notably, all guardrail ranking elements
used in scoring were connected with crash severity and/or crash frequency. Severe crashes are
most commonly associated with the presence of roadside hazards, such as steep slopes or fixed
objects, and are the primary reason why roadside barriers such as guardrail are initially considered.
Furthermore, crash frequency measures the probability that a run-off-road crash will occur at a
location. In the model that was developed, locations that demonstrate severe crash risk and have a
high probability of run-off-road crashes receive higher priority than other locations.
5.1 Findings
The KTC research team developed the newest rating model (model #5) using assigned weightings
and scores of certain elements. Eight elements comprised the final scored list used to assigned
guardrail rankings. The final weighting structure included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Speed Limit – 5%
Lane Width – 5%
Maximum Embankment Slope – 18%
Maximum Embankment Height – 18%
Horizontal Distance from the Edge of the Through Traveled Lane to the (Nearest Fixed
Object) or (Critical Slope) – 18%
Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes – 18%
Excess Expected Crashes – 18%

When researchers compared the new guardrail rating model to the previous model, they analyzed
the rankings of current guardrail need locations in the database. The new model #5 improved upon
the old model but did not significantly alter the rankings of guardrail needs. For example, 23 of
the guardrail sites originally ranked as high-need fell in the rankings with the new model. An
evaluation of the 23 sites demonstrated that only six of them had five or more crashes within the
last five years, and all 23 sites had low EEC values, meaning they were not experiencing more
crashes than expected. AADT, a key component in modeling potential crash exposure, scored high
in only seven sites, which indicates lower traffic volumes.
Many of the 23 sites had high-risk factors related to crash severity such as: speed limits above 55
miles per hour, fixed objects closer than 7 feet, embankment heights equal to or greater than 15
feet, and embankment slopes of 3:1 or greater. By emphasizing crash frequency and crash severity,
the new model targets locations with a higher number of road departure crashes than would be
expected. These higher-risk locations moved up significantly in the new ranking structure,
demonstrating the effectiveness of the new guardrail prioritization model.
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5.2 Recommendations
The KTC research team recommends the following items for implementation based on the results
of this research study:
•
•
•
•

Adopt the new GRP model #5 methodology for use in ranking guardrail need projects
across the state
Provide KYTC personnel, including district offices, with the newly revised guardrail
survey form to collect the necessary data
Provide information and training sessions to KYTC personnel on the development rationale
for the new model and its subsequent implementation
Update the GRP online application and back-end IT architecture to match the new model
data collection and processing requirements
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Appendix A – Current Guardrail Survey Form
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Appendix B – Current Hazard-Index Point System
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Appendix C – New Guardrail Survey Form
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